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There is currently a split of authority among the United States
Circuit courts about whether prisoners have the right to send letters to
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
the
media unopened and unread by prison officials.'
The split

&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0008-1639
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her direction. Thanks to Stephen Temko, Janet Temko, Danielle Pena, and Kiley
Schaumleffel, for their patient encouragement.
1. For cases holding a prisoner has such a right see, e.g., Guajardo v. Estelle,
580 F.2d 748, 759 (5th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 481-82 (5th Cir.
1976); Travis v. Lockhart, 607 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Burton v.
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regarding prisoners' rights lies in each circuit's classification of
prisoner mail as either general or privileged.2 Courts that hold prisons
should treat prisoner mail to the media as general mail have applied
the test developed in Procunierv. Martinez.3 Under the Martinez test,
prison officials may read outgoing general mail if the mail presents a
threat to prison security.4 Contrary to the way general mail is treated,
prison officials may generally not read privileged mail because it
abridges the prisoner's constitutional right to communicate with those
who facilitate a prisoner's access to the courts: individuals or agencies
closely connected to the judicial process.5 In essence, prison officials
may read general mail if doing so is dictated by security concerns,
while prison officials may generally not read privileged mail.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act 6 ("PLRA") has greatly
impacted the way courts should examine the treatment of prisoner
mail to the media as general or privileged mail. PLRA has, along with
several factors, fundamentally changed the prison system.7 PLRA has
imposed burdensome restrictions on prisoners' ability to file lawsuits.8
The result is that courts often reject claims from prisoners seeking
court protection from dangerous conditions and civil rights violations
for failure to first exhaust their remedies through the prison's internal
grievance system.9 PLRA has significantly curtailed prisoners' in
Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1984). For cases holding that no such
right exists see, e.g., Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986); Smith v.
Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1299; Smith, 995 F.2d at 831; Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974). "In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14, (1989),
the Supreme Court overturned Martinez's holding regarding incoming mail,
expressly limiting Martinez to outgoing prisoner mail." Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d
816, 823 (5th Cir. 1993).
4. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409-11.
5. See supra note 1; Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., Constitutionalityof Regulations
Restricting Prisoner Correspondence with the Media, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1151,
1152 (1998); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-77 (1974)).

6. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
7. DAVID FATHI, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON
LITIGATION REFORM ACT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1 (2009) [hereinafter HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH].
8. Id.
9. Id. at 35; Darryl M. James, Reforming Prison Litigation Reform:
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court redress for inhumane conditions in prisons.10 Because PLRA
has made it more difficult for prisoners to get to court, their claims of
dangerous conditions and civil rights violations now depend on the
media for redress. Without access to the media, a prisoner's
constitutional right of access to the courts is a hollow shell. It will
remain so in jurisdictions where mail to the press is not protected as it
would be if it were sent to courts or to attorneys. A Supreme Court
decision to resolve the circuit split in favor of treating prisoner mail to
media as privileged would signal the Court's recognition that media
mail is critical to prisoners' access to the courts and to broader public
discourse. That recognition befits a society that values humane
treatment for its most vulnerable citizens."
Section II of this Article discusses the "hands-off' attitude courts
took toward prison administration problems,12 the gradual departure
from that policy, and finally, the development of constitutional law
addressing prison mail. Prisoners were not seen as people until the
turn of the century, and even then, courts had mostly a "hands-off'
policy towards prison administration until the Warren Court took a
more active approach. But Congressional action in the form of PLRA
and the circuit split on prisoner mail have created a need for the
Supreme Court to step in to protect prisoners' constitutional rights.1 3
Next, Section III addresses the split in authority about whether a
prisoner has the right to send a letter to the media unopened and
unread by prison officials. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits' treatment1 4
Reclaiming Equal Access to Justicefor IncarceratedPersons in America, 12 LOY. J.
PUB. INT. L. 465,475-80 (2011).
10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 35.
11. Fyodor Dostoyevsky once said: "The degree of civilization in a society can
be judged by entering its prisons." See, e.g., Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574,
(W.D. Mich. 2006). Nelson Mandela voiced a similar view in 1994: "No one truly
knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation should be judged not by
how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones." See Susanna Y. Chung, Prison
Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, 68
FORDHAM L. REv 2351, 2351 (2000).

12. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974); Shaw v. Murphy, 532
U.S. 223, 229 (2001); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 386-87 (1996); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 n.16 (1981); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison
Conditionsand the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881, 979 n.306 (2009).
13. See infra Section II.
14. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 482 (5th Cir. 1976); Gaines v. Lane, 790
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of media mail as either privileged or general mail will be compared,
and I will conclude that the Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning
of the Fifth Circuit to safeguard prisoners' constitutional rights.
Then, Section IV outlines the important role the media plays in
publicizing prisoner abuse and gives examples of instances where the
media has exposed prisoner abuse courts had not addressed.
Sections V and VI examine how various state prison systems in
the United States and model codes treat prisoners' mail to the press,
and generally, whether it is read by prison officials or not. The review
reveals there are many states that allow prisoners to send unread mail
to the media as either privileged or general mail, demonstrating that
other states' security concerns may be greatly overstated.15 In light of
the instrumental role the media plays in guaranteeing a prisoner's right
to court access and the restrictions placed upon prisoners by PLRA,
the Sections conclude that the Court should treat prisoners' media
mail as privileged mail. By doing so, the Court would place
prisoners' media mail within the same category as mail to individuals
or agencies closely connected to the judicial process, which prison
officials cannot read even if they assert security concerns. 16
PLRA is the subject of Section VII. PLRA has curtailed
prisoners' ability to redress grievances through the court system.1 7
The impact of PLRA has entirely changed the playing field of
prisoners' rights. Section VII explores the extent of the changes and
argues that particularly because of the new barriers created by PLRA,
the media must be permitted to serve its essential purpose in
protecting prisoners' constitutional rights by having access to
unopened and unread prisoner mail.
Section VIII, in addition to examples throughout the Article, then
specifically describes the problem of retaliation wrought by prison
officials against prisoners who report grievances. This Section
demonstrates why it is paramount for the Court to resolve the circuit
split in favor of giving prisoners unfettered access to the media by

F.2d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986).
15. See infra notes 163-67, 170-73, 175-83.
16. Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1305-06; Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409-11; Travis v.
Lockhart, 607 F. Supp. 1083, 1085-86 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
17. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 35.
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treating their media mail as privileged.' 8 By doing so, the Court
ensures prisoners an alternative means to complain outside the realm
of prison officials, which cannot be intercepted, even if officials cite
security concerns. 19
Finally, Section IX concludes that the Supreme Court should
adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Taylor v Sterrett, and allow
prisoners the right to send unopened and unread mail to the media. 20
II. PRISONERS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS AND MAIL
CENSORSHIP TEST

The historically poor treatment of prisoners in the United States
persisted until the 1960s. The 1960s and 1970s saw a retreat from
courts' "hands-off' approach, and in 1974, the current standard for
whether a prison official may read a prisoner's mail was established.
Prisoners received exceptionally poor treatment in the mid
nineteenth century. 21 Initially, there was a general consensus among
U.S. courts that prisoners had forfeited all rights, even their humanity,
at the prison door, much as if they had physically died.2 2 The state
regarded prisoners as slaves. 23 As such, they were denied access to
courts and had no rights. 24 Prison officials had unfettered discretion in
their treatment of prisoners. 2 5 From the mid-nineteenth century until
the turn of the twentieth century, prisoners' claims were denied based
upon their slave status. 26

18. See supra note 1.
19. Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1305-06; Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409-11; Travis, 607 F.
Supp. at 1085-86.
20. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 482 (5th Cir. 1976).
21. Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1463 (1997).
22. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
23. Richard Guidice Jr., Procreation and the Prisoner: Does the Right to
ProcreateSurvive the Incarcerationand Do Legitimate PenologicalInterests Justify
Restrictions on the Right, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2277, 2282 (2002).
24. Id.
25. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796.
26. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 979 n.306.
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Decided in 1871 in Virginia, Ruffin v. Commonwealth27 illustrates
the common view of early courts regarding prisoners' rights from the
mid-nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century. 28 Woody
Ruffin, a convict, had been hired out from a penitentiary to work
alongside other convicts on the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad in
Bath, Virginia. 29 While he was working on the railroad in Bath,
Ruffin attempted to escape and killed a guard, Louis Swats. 30 A state
statute declared that all criminal proceedings against convicts would
occur in Richmond. 3 1 A Richmond court tried, convicted, and
sentenced Ruffin to death by hanging. 32 On appeal, Ruffin argued that
the Virginia Bill of Rights, contrary to the state statute, required him
to be tried in Bath, where the crime occurred, rather than in
Richmond.3 3 The Virginia Bill of Rights stated, "a man hath a right to
a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage,34 without whose
unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty." 35
The Virginia Court of Appeals rejected Ruffin's argument and
held the penitentiary in Richmond was Ruffin's proper vicinage rather
than Bath, where the crime occurred.3 6 The court reasoned that as a
prisoner, Ruffin "not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal
rights[.] ...

He is for the time being the slave of the State. He is

civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that
of a dead man." 37 The Virginia Bill of Rights did not apply to Ruffin
because he was a prisoner. Ruffin unsuccessfully argued the Virginia
Bill of Rights did apply to him because he was working at the time of

27. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 790.
28. JOHN A FLITER, PRISONERS' RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
STANDARDS OF DECENCY 51 (2000).
29. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 791-92.
30. Id. at 792.
31. Id. at 793.

COURT AND EVOLVING

32. FLITER, supra note 28, at 51.

33. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 792-93.
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1702 (9th ed. 2009) ("The place where a crime

is committed or a trial is held; the place from which jurors are to be drawn for trial;
esp., the locale from which the accused is entitled to have jurors selected.").
35. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 792.
36. Id. at 798-99.
37. Id. at 796.
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the murder, rather than within the confines of the penitentiary. 38 The
court ruled his status as a convict attached as soon as he was
convicted, and he remained a convict whether he was physically in the
penitentiary or not.39
Courts' reluctance to interfere in prisoner matters persisted well
into the 1900s. 40 Until the turn of the twentieth century, prisoners
were denied access to courts based on their status as slaves.4 ' Until
the late 1960s, federal courts adopted a "hands-off' attitude toward
problems of prison administration 42 and traditionally stated that they
were "ill equipped to deal with . . . prison administration."4 3

This

approach perpetuated the status of prisoners as dead men in the eyes
of the law." Justifications for courts' "hands-off' policy "included
separation of powers, the difficulty of administering from the bench
and the greater expertise of prison officials."4 5 One court stated this
policy arose from "Herculean obstacles" prison officials face in
discharging their duties. 46 Further, prison problems were "complex
and intractable", and "not readily susceptible of resolution" by
courts. 47 This "hands-off' approach gave credence to prison officials'
claims that they, not the courts, were in the best position to evaluate
the needs of their prisons and to make decisions concerning
prisoners. 48 Because of this approach, prisoners had very little court
recourse to address abuse. 49

38. Id. at 793.
39. Id.
40. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974).
41. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 979 n.306.
42. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; FLITER, supra note 28, at 52; Dolovich, supra
note 12, at 979 n.306.
43. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001);
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 386-87 (1996); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
351 n.16 (1981); Dolovich, supra note 12, at 979 n.306.
44. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 796.
45. Donovan, supra note 5, at 1152.
46. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404.
47. Id. at 405.
48. Id. at 404.
49. Id.
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This approach did not change until the late 1960s because of
practical and political considerations. 50 Prisoners have never been a
sympathetic group to the public, and they are relatively politically
powerless. For the most part, they do not even have the right to
vote.5 1 Further, they are not a high priority for politicians, since
"there are few places where a politician will win votes by standing up
for the rights of prisoners." 52 Similarly, elected state judges gain little
favor by instituting prison reform. 53 Further, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") and the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), organizations that
eventually played an instrumental role in future prison reforms, were
preoccupied with civil rights litigation. 54 Prior to the 1960s, these
organizations focused little of their resources on prisoners' rights,
further delaying change.5 5 Since courts traditionally deferred to prison
officials' judgment, 56 prisoners were in a weak position to challenge
prison mail policies.
Without a political base that supported
prisoners' rights, judges and other elected officials had little incentive
to interfere with the "hands-off' approach.
The pendulum swung towards more favorable prisoners' rights
decisions in the 1960s and 1970s.5 7 During that time, the Warren
Court58 slowly retreated from the "hands-off' approach to prison
conditions. 59 Prior to 1963, federal prisoners were unable to bring
claims in district courts for torts suffered while in federal prison. 60
However, in 1963, the Warren Court's decision in United States v.
Muniz allowed federal prisoners to sue the United States for injuries
caused by government employees, and receive damages under the
50. FLITER, supra note 28, at 64; Dolovich, supra note 12, at 979 n.306.
51. Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2169 (1996).
52. Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp.2d 162, 175 (D. Mass. 2004).
53. FLITER, supra note 28, at 65.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 64.
56. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 979 n.306.
57. Id.; FLITER, supra note 28, at 65.
58. The Warren Court refers to the Supreme Court of the United States
between 1953 and 1969, when Earl Warren served as Chief Justice.
59. FLITER, supra note 28, at 65.
60. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 979 n.306.
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Federal Tort Claims Act. 6 1 A year later, the Court expanded this right
to state prisoners under Cooper v. Pate, which allowed prisoners to
bring a civil action for deprivation of rights against prison officials. 62
These decisions paved the way for the Burger Court to later examine
prisoners' rights issues by expanding prisoners' access to the court
system, 63 and eventually set the stage for the Court's examination of
prison mail policies in Procunierv. Martinez.6
In Procunier v. Martinez,6 5 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the California Department of Corrections
regulations on censorship of outgoing prisoner mail,6 6 and for the first
time applied the First Amendment's freedom of speech clause. 67 The
mail regulations at issue in Martinez prohibited prisoners from writing
letters that unduly complained, magnified grievances, or expressed
"inflammatory political, racial, religious, or other views or beliefs" to
persons other than licensed attorneys and public officials. 68 If a
prisoner wrote such material, a prison employee inspecting the letter
could find the letter objectionable and either refuse to mail it, submit a
disciplinary report, or place a copy of the letter in the prisoner's file,
where it could potentially be factored into parole eligibility. 69
In considering these regulations, the Court formulated a test to
analyze the constitutionality of prison regulations on outgoing mail.70
To arrive at the test, the Court focused on the rights of the nonprisoner recipient of the mail, rather than on the prisoners' rights as
senders.7 1 Specifically, the Court focused on non-prisoner recipients'
right to "protection against unjustified governmental interference with

61.
62.
(2011).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); see generally 42 U.S.C

§

1983

FLITER, supra note 28, at 69.

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 396 (1974).
Id. at 398.
Id.
Donovan, supra note 5, at 1152.
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 408.
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the intended communication" under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.7 2 The Court established a test that required:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an
important or substantial government interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression. Prison officials may not censor inmate
correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome
opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must
show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or
more of the substantial government interests of security, order, and
rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of the First Amendment
freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular government interest involved.73
Using this test, the Court found the California prison regulations to be
unconstitutional because there was no legitimate "governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." 74
Martinez thus formulated the test courts apply to prisoner's
general mail.7 5 While the holding in Martinez was a breakthrough in
the civil rights of prisoners, it was limited to the California prison
regulations at issue in that case and applied solely to censorship of
general mail.76 General mail is mail addressed to those who are not
involved with or responsible for the prisoner's incarceration, like
family members or friends, as opposed to the prisoner's attorney.77
The definition of "censor" is: "To officially inspect ... and delete
material considered offensive." 78 According to Martinez, opening and
reading outgoing general mail is not unconstitutional censorship
because it does not involve the deletion of material. 79 According to
72. Id. (citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972); Martin v. City of Struthers,

319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).

73. Id. at 409-ll.
74. Id. at 413.
75. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1976); Donovan, supra note
5, at 1151-52.
76. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 415; Taylor, 532 F.2d at 466; Donovan, supra note
5, at 1151-52.
77. Donovan, supra note 5, at 1152.
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
79. Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 722 (5th Cir. 2004); Donovan, supra note
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one circuit court, "freedom from censorship is not equivalent to
freedom from inspection or perusal."8 0 For example, consistent with
this holding, a prison official could open an inmate letter to the media
and read it, but if there were unflattering comments about the guards
or conditions, the official could black out those comments only if
doing so furthered a substantial government interest.81
An important distinction lies in the difference between what is
termed general mail and what is termed privileged mail. Privileged
mail is mail that implicates a prisoner's constitutional right to
communicate with those who facilitate access to the courts. The test
formulated in Martinez does not apply to privileged mail.82 The split
in the circuit courts as to whether inmates have the right to send
unopened and unread mail to the media turns on whether the mail is
considered privileged or general mail.8 3
Prison officials may open and read general mail without violating
the First Amendment as long as no censorship is involved. 84
Privileged mail, however, is different, since it implicates the
constitutional right for an inmate to communicate directly with the
courts or with those who communicate to the courts on the prisoner's
behalf. 85 A prisoner's ability to send mail to his attorney is a conduit
for him to exercise his constitutional right of access to the court
system; thus, this kind of mail is privileged.86 As such, outgoing mail
to an inmate's attorney may generally not be opened or read unless
there is reasonable cause to suspect contraband is contained in the
mail. The test used in Martinez applies when determining whether
prison officials may constitutionally censor outgoing general mail, but
does not apply to privileged mail. Consequently, whether the prisoner
is corresponding with courts-or with individuals interacting with the

5, at 1151-52.
80. Busby, 359 F.3d at 722 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576
(1974)).
81. Busby, 359 F.3d at 722.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 1.
84. Busby, 359 F.3d at 722.
85. Donovan, supra note 5, at 1152.
86. See infra notes 175-83; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-77 (1974).
87. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 1976).
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courts on the prisoner's behalf-determines the protection afforded to
the prisoner's mail.
Thus, prisoners' rights have come a long way since the days when
prisoners were treated as slaves and dead persons by the state. Now,
prisoners have significant constitutional rights even though they are
incarcerated. There is currently a circuit split that necessitates
Supreme Court action to protect prisoners' constitutional rights.88 As
a natural continuance of the evolution of prisoners' rights, the
Supreme Court should resolve this split in authority by declaring that
prisoner mail to the media should be treated as privileged and should
not be subject to opening and review by prison officials.

III.

CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE STATUS OF PRISONERS'
MAIL TO THE PRESS

Because privileged mail is afforded constitutional protection that
general mail is not, the classification of mail as general or privileged
is of great consequence. Circuit courts are divided on whether mail
sent to the media should be considered general mail-to be scrutinized
under the Martinez test-or privileged mail to be afforded a higher
degree of protection, similar to correspondence with attorneys and the
court system. 89 Taylor v. Sterrett, a Fifth Circuit opinion, and Gaines
v. Lane, a Seventh Circuit opinion, illustrate the split in the circuit
courts. 90 Taylor has the better-reasoned approach. Under Taylor,
prisoners' mail to the media receives the elevated protection of
privileged mail. 9 1
Taylor involved prison inmates arguing that restrictions on
sending mail unopened and unread by prison officials to the media
abridged their rights to due process and equal protection under the
law. 92 They also argued that opening and reading mail addressed to
the press "would at least chill those communications resulting in the
diminution of [those constitutional] rights." 93 The court agreed with
88.
89.
1986).
90.
91.
92.
93.

See infra Section III.
Taylor, 532 F.2d at 462; Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1299 (7th Cir.
Taylor, 532 F.2d at 462; Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1299.
Taylor, 532 F.2d at 470.
Id. at 468.
Id.
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the prisoners' arguments and recognized that in certain instances, the
press participates in, and may influence, judicial proceedings by
creating publicity, and is therefore similar to other protected mail sent
to redress grievances. 94
To reach this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Hull, which held that prisoners'
access to the courts could not be abridged.9 5 In Hull, the Court
reviewed a Michigan regulation that required prisoners' petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus to be approved by the state's welfare office
before filing to ensure the legal documents were "properly drawn." 96
The Supreme Court found the requirement to be an unconstitutional
impairment of prisoners' rights of access to the judicial system. 97
The Fifth Circuit brought communication with the press within
Hull's ambit by classifying the press as a means for "free expression
and ... petitioning the government for redress of grievances." 98
Taylor holds the Martinez test inapplicable when constitutional
violations are involved. 99 The court saw outgoing mail sent to the
media as crucial to a prisoner's rights of free expression and
petitioning the government for redress of grievances. As a result, the
court held it should be treated like privileged mail to attorneys and the
courts, which also implicates constitutional rights.' 0
In Gaines v. Lane, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion when considering whether mail to the media should be
considered privileged. 0 1 There, the Seventh Circuit recognized the
media and public could play an important role in petitioning the
government for redress of grievances. 102 However, the court noted
prisoners have "substantial opportunities to petition the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches directly," by use of already

94. Id. at 470.
95. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 547 (1941).
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Taylor, 532 F.2d at 471.
98. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 470-71.
99. Id. at 471.
100. Id. at 481-82.
101. Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1986).
102. Id. at 1306.
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allowable privileged mail.10 3 In light of these alternatives and
reasonable means of redress, the Seventh Circuit found no need to
allow prisoners the right to send unopened and unread mail to the
media.104 While this approach still allows prisoners to send mail to
the media as general mail, prison officials can read it in the interest of
prison security.10 5 This approach has several negative consequences.
For example, there is the possibility that prison officials, after reading
prisoner mail, might retaliate against those who complain about prison
conditions. Combined with the importance of prisoner access to the
media, state data and model codes, and restrictions imposed by PLRA,
the Seventh Circuit's rule is untenable.
The rule from the Fifth Circuit in Taylor is that prisoner mail to
the media is treated as privileged and may be neither read nor
censored, while the rule from the Seventh Circuit classifies prisoner
mail to the media as general mail, which can be read.106 The Supreme
Court should resolve this circuit split. Supreme Court Rule 10
embodies a preference for resolving circuit splits: "A petition for a
writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.... [One
compelling reason is that] a United States court of appeals has entered
a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court
of appeals on the same important matter."1 07 During his Senate
confirmation hearing, Chief Justice Roberts stated the Court should
take cases that help to produce more uniform federal law.'o There is
a glaring lack of uniformity in the circuits' treatment of prisoners'
media mail and ample authority for the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to review the issue.
Taylor should apply nationwide because it properly equates
prisoner mail to the media with other constitutionally protected mail
sent to correspondents closely connected to the judicial process. 09
103. Id. at 1307.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1304, 1307.
106. Id. at 1307; Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 482 (5th Cir. 1976).
107. SUP. CT. R. 10(a), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
ctrules/201ORulesoftheCourt.pdf.
108. Tziporah Schwartz Tapp, Recent Development, Refusing to Compare
Apples and Oranges: Why the Fourth Circuit Got It Right in United States v.
Divens, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1267, 1287, 1290 (2012).
109. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 481-82.
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Taylor correctly recognizes the media's outsized role in publicizing
prisoner abuse and obtaining redress for prisoner grievances,
protecting prisoners' constitutional rights the same as other privileged
correspondence. Opening mail to the press violates the prisoner's
right to redress grievances, because the press participates in and may
influence judicial proceedings by creating publicity,I 0 as discussed in
the following Section.

IV. HoucHINS: THE MEDIA ISAN ESSENTIAL CONDUIT BY WHICH
PRISONERS CAN PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR
REDRESS OF THEIR GRIEVANCES
Two examples highlight the critical role the media can play in
exposing prison abuse. First is the Supreme Court case Houchins v.
KQED."ti Though the Court ultimately denied KQED's request to
access a prison to report on the conditions there, it recognized the
importance of the media as the "eyes and ears" of the public and that
the media fulfills an important role by communicating with prisoners
through the mail.1 12
KQED is a television station in San Francisco that aired reports on
conditions at prisons around the Bay Area in the 1970s.11 3 One such
report discussed a prisoner suicide in the Greystone wing of the
Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita.11 4 In KQED's report, one
psychiatrist hypothesized that the conditions in that particular wing
within the jail might have led the prisoner to commit suicide."'
Consequently, KQED requested access to the facility to take pictures
and investigate the psychiatrist's remarks. 1 6 After jail officials
denied the request, KQED and the NAACP filed suit. 117
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's injunction
preventing prison officials from denying KQED access to the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 470.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
Id. at 8, 15.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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Greystone wing of the jail, and the Supreme Court eventually granted
certiorari. 18 In a decision written by Justice Burger, the Court agreed
with KQED's argument that the media plays a crucial role in
providing information and that "an informed public [is] a safeguard
against 'misgovernment."' 1 9 Further, the Court reasoned that the
media is "a powerful antidote to any abuses by governmental officials
and [is a] constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected
by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to
serve." 12 0 Within the context of prisons specifically, the Court noted
that society owes prison inmates a special duty since correctional
facilities are public institutions and "each person placed in prison
becomes, in effect, a ward of the state."121 Accordingly, there can be
no doubt prison conditions are "matters of 'great public
122
importance."'
KQED unfortunately lost its bid for greater access to the prison
for its reporters. 123 Although the Court recited the many ways the
media plays a beneficiary role by exposing prison conditions and
"contributing to remedial action," it found the media does not have a
greater constitutional right to access jails and prisons than the general
public. 124 According to the Court, the Constitution provided no basis
to allow the media to walk through a prison with camera equipment
and take pictures.125 However, the decision only applies to media
access to prison facilities, not communication, as the "right to receive
ideas and information [was] not at issue."l 26 In fact, the Court
acknowledged one of the ways the media accomplishes its purpose is
through its right to "receive letters from inmates criticizing jail
officials and reporting on conditions." 27 KQED is the Court's
acknowledgement of the role the press plays as the "eyes and ears" of
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.

122. Id.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1, 8-9.
Id. at 8-9.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 15 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-18 (1974)).
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the public by communicating with prisoners by mail. 128 Prisoners'
unabridged communication with the media by mail is essential to
publicizing prison conditions. 129
Another example also helps demonstrate that a prisoner's right to
send mail to the media can be crucial to exposing prisoner abuse
inside correctional facilities. Beginning in 2010, the Los Angeles
Times published a series of articles detailing widespread and
staggering abuse allegations within the Los Angeles prison system.130
In one instance, a sheriff's deputy witnessed a guard beating an
inmate, leaving him with a fractured cheekbone and injuries to his left
ear, rib cage, and face.' 31 In another instance, guards sprayed pepper
spray at an inmate's anus and groin after he used profanity when
insulting a guard.13 2 Another article in the series featured a jail
monitor who reported seeing deputies treat one inmate like "a
punching bag," beating him and shocking him with a taser as he lay
unconscious for at least two minutes. 3 3 Yet another article described
how deputies would often yell "stop resisting" even when the inmate
was compliant so as to later justify their actions. 1 34 As a result of
these allegations of widespread abuse in prisons, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI") initiated an investigation into prison
conditions in Los Angeles County. 135 After the FBI investigation and

128. KQED, 438 U.S. at 8, 15.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Robert Faturechi, Jails Under Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/a-me-jails-sg%2CO%2C483465 1.storygallery
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
131. Jack Leonard, Assault Charges Filed Against Deputies Accused of
Punching and Kicking Inmate, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/05/local/la-me-jail-beating5-2010aprO5.
132. Robert Faturechi, Man Accuses Deputies of JailAttack, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2010, availableat http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/26/local/la-me-jail-abusetrial-20100826.
133. Robert Faturechi, Monitor Says She Saw Deputies Beat Inmate 'Like a
Punching Bag,' L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com
/201 1/feb/08/news/lasd9.
134. Id.
135. Robert Faturechi, FBI Probing Report of Beatings in LA. County Jails,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com
/201 1/sep/25/local/la-me-fbi-jails-20110925.
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additional investigation by the ACLU, the ACLU publicly called for
Sheriff Lee Baca's resignation.13 6
Prisoners in California do not have the right to send unopened and
uncensored mail to media organizations like the Los Angeles
Times. 137 However, they are permitted to send uncensored and unread
mail to legal organizations like the ACLU.13 8 In its series, the Los
Angeles Times included an annual report on Los Angeles County jail
conditions compiled by the ACLU.1 39 The series also shared many
instances of abuse that prisoners had reported by letter, telephone, or
face-to-face interviews. 140 These accounts included the story of an
inmate beaten by eight officers but instructed not to tell the medical
staff "anything funny" occurred.141 Another story was about prison
guards punching an inmate in the "ribs, back, and mouth and eyes,
breaking his eye socket and leaving his body badly bruised. He was
then kicked with steel toe boots and forced to strip naked and walk
42
through the cell block while the deputies yelled 'gay boy walking."'l
These instances of abuse illustrate the dangers of guards reading
prisoner's mail to the media. The same guards who were engaged in
the abuse would likely have been the readers of inmates' outgoing
mail. It is therefore doubtful that the narratives of abuse in the Los
Angeles Times series would have come to the public attention if the
prisoners had not had the ability to communicate with the ACLU
136. Richard Winton & Robert Faturechi, ACLU: Sheriff Lee Baca must resign
over County Jail report, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/09/aclu-calls-for-sheriff-lee-baca-toresign-over-inmate-abuse-in-county-jails-.html.
137. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3141 (2011); CAL CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3142
(2011).
138. The mail is still inspected for contraband, which involves opening the
letter upside down without reading the text and shaking it to reveal any hidden
contraband. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3141 (2011); CAL CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3142
(2011).
Robert Faturechi, Jails Under Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, available at
139.
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-jails-sg%2CO%2C483465 1.storygallery
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
140. Steve Marble & Ben Walsh, ACLU Annual Report on LA. County Jail
Conditions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2011, at 3, available at http://
documents.1atimes.com /aclu-report-la-county-jails/.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. at 17.
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without fear prison officials would uncover their grievances. These
accounts also illustrate the justified fear and real danger prisoners
often face in American prisons. The severity of these accounts
demonstrates that instances of prisoner abuse are indeed, in the words
of the Justice Burger, matters of "great public importance." 4 3
Taylor's rule recognizing prisoners' right to send unopened mail to the
media is a logical extension of KQED and recent examples of prisoner
abuse affirm the media's outsized role in publicizing prisoner abuse
and obtaining redress for prisoners' grievances. The next Section
turns the Article's focus from how the media can affect judicial
proceedings to how states are already treating the issue of prisoner
mail to the media.
V. CURRENT LAWS: INMATE CORRESPONDENCE
THE UNITED STATES

WITH THE MEDIA IN

Should the Supreme Court take up the issue of whether prisoners
have the right to send unopened and unread mail to the media, state
correctional facility policies show justifications for reading prisoner
mail to the press based on prison security concerns are likely
overstated. Inmates should thus have the right to correspond with the
press free from the prying eyes of the individuals whose abuse they
may be reporting.
A footnote in Martinez says: "[w]hile not
necessarily controlling, the policies followed at other well-run
institutions would be relevant to a determination of the need for a
particular type of restriction."144
To compare and contrast states' treatment of prisoners' mail to the
press, I conducted a survey of the statutes and administrative rules of
all fifty states. Of these, data was unavailable for eighteen states. Of
the remaining thirty-two states, fourteen treat mail to the media the
same as general mail, including Alaska, 145 California, 14 6

Connecticut,14 7 Idaho, 148 Illinois,1 49 Iowa,150 Kansas,1 s' Louisiana, 15 2
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (2000).
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414 (1974).
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.520 (b) & (c) (2012).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3141 (2013).
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 18-81-28(c) (2013).
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 06.01.01.402 (2012).
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 525.110(g) & 525.130(h) (2012).
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Massachusetts,' 5 3 Minnesota,' 5 4 New Hampshire,15 5 Oregon, 15 6 South
Dakota, 5' 7 and Washington. 158
The remaining eighteen states vary in their treatment of mail sent
to the media. Some states treat it as privileged, the same as legal
mail.159 Generally, privileged mail will be sent either unopened, or if
it is inspected, opened only in the prisoner's presence and only to
check for contraband.160 A privileged letter cannot be read, even if
contraband is found and removed.161 Some states allow all general
mail to be sent unopened unless there is a reasonable suspicion it may
contain contraband.162
Indiana,163 Michigan,164 New Jersey, 165 Texas,16 6 and West
Virginia 67 classify mail sent to the media as privileged.168 Generally,
all mail from prisoners to the media in these states is delivered to the
mailroom sealed and cannot be opened unless there is a reasonable
belief that there is a threat to facility order and security.' 69 Georgia,
for example, inspects mail sent by prisoners to the media with a
fluoroscope and metal detector, without ever opening the letter.170

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
0010(14),
157.
158.
159.

IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 201-50.19(356,356A) (c), (d) (2011).
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 44-12-601(a)(1)(C)-(b)(6) (2012).
LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 22, § 313(D), (E), & (F)(3) (2012).
103 MASS. CODE REGs. 481.11(1),481.13(2) (2013).
MINN. R. 2911.3300(3) (2011).
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. 301.05(b), (e), (h) (2011).
OR. ADMIN. R. 291-131-0030(1), (2) (2011); OR ADMIN. R. 291-131(18) (2011); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-131-0015(6) (2011).
S.D. ADMIN. R. 17:50:10.02 (2011).
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-48-030 (2011).
See infra notes 163-67, 170-73.

160. Id.

161. Id.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See infra notes 175-83.
210 IND. ADMIN. CODE 3-1-16(c) (2011).
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 791.6603 (2011).
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1OA:18-2.7(b), (c).
37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 291.2(2)(A) (2011).
W. VA. CODE R. § 95-2-17 (17.10.1) (2011).
See supra notes 163-67.
Id.
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 125-3-3-03 (2011).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol49/iss2/3

20

Temko: Prisoners and the Press: The First Amendment Antidote to Civil D

2013]

PRISONERS AND THE PRESS

215

Arizona,17 ' Arkansas,' 7 2 and Florida,17 3 similarly treat prisoner's mail
to the media as privileged and unread, though it is also inspected in
the presence of the prisoner for contraband.174
Finally, states that are the most protective of prisoners' mail rights
are Maine,s7 1 Maryland,' 6 Nebraska,1 7 7 New York,17 s North
Carolina, 179 Ohio,so Pennsylvania,1 8 1 Rhode Island,182 and
Virginia.18 3 Media mail in these states is not classified as privileged.
Instead, all general mail in these states can be sent unopened and
unread to whomever the inmate desires. 184 Generally, all mail from
prisoners is not read or inspected unless there is reason to believe it is
the subject of illegal or unauthorized activity.18 5 Where illegal
activity is reasonably suspected, prison officials then have the
authority to inspect and read mail, but only after receiving
authorization or fulfilling other prerequisites.1 86
Whether or not the Court classifies prisoner mail to the media as
general or privileged, state practices show that many prisons are
already run safely without prison officials reading prisoners' media
mail. Even if the Court classifies media mail as general mail, prison
officials should not be permitted to read prisoners' general mail to the
media. Prison officials should only be able to read prisoners' mail if
171. State v. Pecard, 998 P.2d 453, 457 (Ariz. 2000).
172. ARK. CODE R. § 004.00.02-860 (2011).
173. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-210.103(1), (5)(b) (2011).
174. See supra notes 170-173.
175. ME. CODE R. 03-201 Ch. 1 § II.a(K.2) (2011).
176. MD. CODE REGS. 12.02.03.10(F)(30) (2011); MD. CODE REGS.
12.02.20.04(E) (2011); MD. CODE REGS. 12.02.20.01 (B)(4) (2011).
177. 68 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 007 (2011); 68 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 009
(2011).
178. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 721.2 (2011); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 720.3(e)(1-2), N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 7, § 721.3(a)(2)
(2011).
179. 5 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2D.0307(e) (2011).
180. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-9-18 (2011).
181. 37 PA. CODE § 93.2 (2011).
182. 17-1-18 R.I. CODE R. § 111 (2011).
183. 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 15-45-1790 (2011).
184. See supra notes 175-83.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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doing so is constitutionally permissible under the Martinez test.8 7
The Martinez test requires prison officials show the regulation
allowing prison officials to read general mail to the media is related to
security.
State policies suggest there is no cogent security threat in allowing
prisoners to send unread mail to the media. Eighteen of the thirty-two
states surveyed do not permit prison officials to read mail to the
media.' 89 Even more protective of prisoners' rights, nine out of those
eighteen states, allow inmates to send mail to whomever they want,
even the general public, without the surveillance of prison officials.' 90
The fact that these states have apparently been able to operate their
prison systems effectively without reading prisoners' mail to the
media and in some cases to the general public suggests security
concerns are overstated.
If the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split by treating inmate
mail as privileged, as nine states have done, 1 9 1 the Martinez test does
not come into play, because privileged mail is deemed automatically
protected under prisoners' right to access the courts and redress
grievances.192 Classifying inmates' mail to the media as privileged is
the better policy route. At first glance there appears to be no
difference between states that classify prisoner mail to the media as
"privileged" versus "general," where the ultimate outcome is that
prison officials cannot read the mail.193 But this distinction will be
crucial to resolving the circuit split. If the Supreme Court classifies
prisoner mail to the media as privileged, it would be treated the same
as mail to legal counsel. 194 Since PLRA, discussed below, has
severely limited prisoners' ability to address grievances through

187.
188.
note 5, at
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
Id.; Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1976); Donovan, supra
1151-52.
See supra notes 163-67, 170-73, 175-83.
See supra notes 175-83.
See supra notes 163-67, 170-73.
Taylor, 532 F.2d at 466; Donovan, supra note 5, at 1151.
See supra notes 163-67, 170-73, 175-83.
Donovan, supra note 5, at 1151-52.
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lawsuits, 195 the media should fill the void and provide a conduit for
prisoners to redress their grievances.
Treating prisoner mail as privileged would signal the Court's
recognition that media mail is critical to preserving inmates'
constitutional rights. Further, if the mail to the media was classified
as general mail, states may be freer to carve out exceptions to their
ban on reading general mail should there be increased security
concerns. However, if media mail is classified as privileged, prison
officials would have a clear mandate from the Court that media mail
implicates constitutional rights and may not be read. This state survey
lends support to Taylor's rule, and the idea that prison officials do not
need to be reading inmate mail to the press. The next Section
discusses how model codes and international standards also lead to
this conclusion.
VI. MODEL CODES AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON A PRISONER'S
RIGHT To COMMUNICATE WITH THE MEDIA

Along with state policies, model codes and international policies
may also serve as guidance to the Court in resolving whether prisoners
should have the right to send unopened mail to the media. For
example, publishers of the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model
Sentencing and Corrections Act recommend a communications
procedure similar to the most liberal states. 196 The Act advocates "the
opening and search for contraband or prohibited material ... [only]
upon obtaining reliable information that a particular communication
may jeopardize the safety of the public or security or safety within a

facility."1 97
Similarly, the Department of Justice's Federal Standards for
Prisons and Jails suggest that "[i]nmate mail, both incoming and
outgoing, [should not be] read, censored, or rejected, except where
there is a reasonable belief of a threat to the safety or security of the
institution ... [or the mail is] used in furtherance of illegal
activities."198
195. See infra Section VII.
196. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SENTENCING AND CORRECTION ACT

UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL

§ 4-117(a) & (b) (1979).

197. Id.
198.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND
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The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice would classify media
mail as general mail but only allow outgoing general mail to be read if
the safety of the public and security of the institution are
jeopardized. 199 Going even further, the National Sheriffs' Association
recommends all outgoing letters be mailed without inspection, stating
"[t]he likelihood that contraband will be smuggled out of the jail is too
small to justify any other procedure." 200
Finally, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution,
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, may also
provide some guidance to the Court. 20 1 A few states have expressly
adopted the Standard Minimum Rules, which likely played a role in
the development of the Model Penal Code and the correctional
standards discussed in the previous Section, since their principals are
comparable. 202 These rules state that prisoners should be able to make
complaints to the inspector of prisons or other inspecting officers
"without the director or other members of the staff being present." 203
While not involving the same risk or security concerns with mail, the
policy gives the impression it is important to allow prisoners the
ability to complain away from a jailor's watchful eye.
These suggested policies by a wide variety of respected
organizations demonstrate that even where prisoner mail to the press
is classified as general instead of privileged, absent a threat to prison
security, prison officials should not open or read prisoners' media
mail. In addition to the state survey discussed in the previous Section,
model codes and international policies also show that prison security
JAILS § 12.05 (1980).
199. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, § 23-6.1 (2d ed.1981).
200. NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION, INMATES' LEGAL RIGHTS, 42-43

(1974); On the other hand, the Manual of Standards for Adult Correctional
Institutions recommends reading prisoners mail on a random basis. AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, § 4342.01 (1979).
201. UNITED NATIONS, STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS, Aug. 30, 1955, available at http://www.unhcr.org /refworld/docid/

3ae6b36e8.html [hereinafter United Nations StandardMinimum Rules].
202. Sara A. Rodriguez, The Impotence of Being Earnest: Status of the United
Nations StandardMinimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisonersin Europe and the
United States, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 61, 111 (2007).
203. United Nations StandardMinimum Rules, supra note 201.
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claims concerning prisoner mail may be overblown anyway, as many
prisons function securely without opening prisoner mail. The
following two Sections address two additional reasons why it is
critical for prisoners to be able to send unopened mail to the media.
VII. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT ("PLRA")

Should the Supreme Court examine the split regarding whether
prison officials may open and read prisoners' mail to the media, it
ought to consider new developments in legislation that have made it
harder for prisoners to have their grievances addressed through the
courts. Recent laws have greatly restricted prisoner access to the
courts compared with prior legislation, and prisoner mail to the media
is one of the few tools of redress left for prisoners.
PLRA, an expansive piece of legislation, was passed by Congress
and signed into law by President Clinton in 1996.204 PLRA was
enacted to counteract the perceived problem that prisoners were filing
too many frivolous lawsuits. 2 05 Proponents claimed PLRA would
increase the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding persons. 206
Senator Robert Dole stated during a Senate debate of an early version
of PLRA, "[t]his amendment will help put an end to the inmate
litigation fun-and-games." 20 7 Further, "[firivolous lawsuits filed by
prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable legal resources, and affect
the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding citizens." 208 Before the
Senate Chamber, Senator Orrin Hatch similarly complained:
'U]ailhouse lawyers with little better to do are tying our courts in
As
knots with the endless flow of frivolous litigation. "'209
justification for PLRA, the authors cited a number of seemingly
groundless suits based on trivial prisoner complaints including: eating
chunky instead of smooth peanut butter, 2 10 receiving an unsatisfactory
204. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 1.
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1.
208. 141 CONG. REC. S14611-01, at 14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Dole).
209. Eugene Novikov, Stacking the Deck: Futility and the Exhaustion
Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 817, 817 (2008).
210. Id.
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haircut, not being invited to a pizza party, and having inadequate
locker space.2 1 1 PLRA passed with broad support from both
Democrats and Republicans 2 12 with little serious debate. 2 13 Despite
PLRA's broad support from politicians, prisoners' rights advocates
feel the legislation has led to a denial of equal access to the court
system for prisoners. 214
Legislation in place before PLRA was more favorable to
prisoners' court access. Before the passage of PLRA, the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA") governed prisoners'
lawsuits. 215 CRIPA was described as, "[a]n Act to authorize actions
for redress in cases involving deprivations of rights of institutionalized
persons secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States."2 16 CRIPA placed barriers in front of prisoners before they
could access courts, but it was still easier for inmates to petition courts
for redress of civil rights violations under CRIPA than under
PLRA.2 17
Enacted in 1980,218 CRIPA aimed to address widespread
deprivations of prisoners' civil rights. 2 19 CRIPA mandated the
creation of "minimum standards for the development and
implementation of a plain, speedy, and effective system for the
resolution of grievances of adults confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility." 220 This system created administrative bodies or
grievance systems in jails that acted as barriers to prisoners reaching
court. 221
Courts had discretion to require the use of these
211. Corbett H. Williams, Evisceration of the First Amendment: The Prison
Litigation Reform Act and Interpretationof 42 U.S.C. § 1997E(E) in PrisonerFirst
Amendment Claims, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REv 859, 861 (2006).
212. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 9.
213. Williams, supra note 211, at 863.
214.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 1.

215. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349, 349 (1980).
216. Id.
217. Novikov, supra note 209, at 819.
218. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat.
349 (1980) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997) [hereinafter CRIPA].
219. Novikov, supra note 209, at 819.
220. CRIPA, supra note 218.
221. Id.; Joseph Alvarado, Keeping Jailers from Keeping the Keyes to the
Courthouse: The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement and
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administrative bodies before filing a lawsuit. 22 2 A court could, at its
own discretion, stay a suit for up to ninety days to require a prison
litigant to exhaust jail administrative procedures.2 2 3 However, courts
would not enforce this requirement where the jail administrative
procedures did not meet certain minimum standards. 2 24 Thus, under
CRIPA, courts had discretion to require prisoners to use
administrative procedures and exhaustion was not required where the
administrative procedures did not meet minimum standards.2 2 5
PLRA changed the exhaustion requirement. The discretionary
grievance systems under CRIPA became mandatory under PLRA.2 2 6
PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all administrative options before
filing a claim in federal court. 227 Despite the increased reliance on
grievance systems, PLRA no longer requires that these procedures be
"fair and effective." 228 Even if the relief sought by prisoners (e.g.,
compensatory damages) is unavailable through an administrative
procedure, they are still required to exhaust that administrative
procedure before they may file a complaint. 229 If these available
administrative remedies are not exhausted before filing, the suit is
automatically dismissed.2 30
PLRA is structurally flawed because the prison officials or staff
members involved in the grievance procedure are often the same
individuals who allegedly violated the prisoner's rights. 23 1 For
example, in Sanders v. Bachus, an inmate claimed he was verbally and
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 323, 326
(2009).
222. Robin L. Dull, Understanding Proper Exhaustion: Using the SpecialCircumstances Test to Fill the Gaps Under Woodford v. Ngo and Provide Incentives
for Effective Prison Grievance Procedures,92 IOWA L. REv. 1929, 1932-33 (2007).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2011).
227. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2011); Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 98-99 (2nd
Cir. 2000).
229. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731, 734 (2001).
230. Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1026.
231.

HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 12.
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physically abused on multiple occasions by two prison guards. 2 32 The
grievance procedures at the facility stated: "[P]rior to submitting a
written grievance, the grievant shall attempt to resolve the issue with
the staff member involved within two business days after becoming
aware of a grievable issue .... If the complaint is not resolved, the
grievant may file a Step I grievance." 233 Instead, the prisoner filed a
written grievance and did not confront his attackers. 234 This prisoner
was held to have failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because
he did not complete the procedure properly. 235 Thus, the court
dismissed the prisoner's complaint without consideration of its
merits. 236
Minix v. Pazera is a shocking example of a court not finding
exhaustion. 237 In Minix, a mother brought an action on behalf of her
son, Steven Zick, for injuries he suffered while incarcerated as a
minor at the South Bend Juvenile Facility in 2002 and 2003.238 The
facts are disturbing: Zick sustained bruises and other injuries after
other minors in the facility assaulted him as part of an initiation. 2 39
The guards made no effort to investigate the incident or protect Zick
after the incident. 240 The other minors continued to attack him over
the remaining period of his incarceration. 24 1 On one occasion, he had
a seizure, causing him to foam at the mouth. 242 Still, the guards did
nothing. 24 3 In addition to the beatings, Zick was raped and witnessed
the rape of another child. 24 Zick did not report either of the rapes or
any of the beatings to the staff because he feared the consequences of
232. Sanders v. Bachus, No. 1:07 CV 360, 2008 WL 5422857, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 10, 2008).
233. Id. at *5.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *6.
237. Minix v Pazera, No. 1:04 CV 447 RM, 2005 WL 1799538, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. July 27, 2005).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at *1-2.
242. Id.
243. Id.

244. Id. at *1.
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"being labeled a snitch." 245 Reporting the behavior may not have been
effective, as there was evidence of staff members encouraging
beatings and even arranging for fights to occur. 246
According to the district court, Zick's claim rested upon whether
he had exhausted the facility's administrative grievance procedures. 247
The court found that his claim failed because he had not filed an
internal grievance for these events.2 4 8 Zick's mother argued that she
had, in effect, completed the grievance process on behalf of her son
since she complained of her son's mistreatment to several members of
She also sought help from multiple
the facility's staff.249
superintendents, contacted the Department of Corrections' Deputy
Commissioner, and even contacted the Governor of Indiana. 250 She
argued that after contacting all of these sources without recourse, she
and her son were left with no other available remedies. 251 The court
disagreed and held Zick's claim was barred since he had not complied
with the available administrative process. 252 His mother's efforts,
while "heroic," were not sufficient because she did not complain to
the proper officials designated by the grievance process. 25 3 In denying
Zick's claim, the court reasoned, "a prisoner must comply with the
administrative process made available to prisoners as it exists, not as it
might have been written." 254
In addition to the unfair administrative exhaustion requirement,
PLRA imposes several other burdens on prisoners' access to the
federal courts. For example, in a majority of federal courts, prisoners
cannot bring any claims for compensatory damages resting on a
mental or emotional injury they suffered while confined unless it is
accompanied by a physical injury. 255 In one case, a prisoner claimed a
245. Id. at *2.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *3.
248. Id. at *7.
249. Id. at *4.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at *7.
253. Id. at *4, *7.
254. Id. at *4. (citing Carroll v. Yates, 362 F.3d 984, 985 (7th Cir. 2004); Pozo
v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 2002)).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2011); Jason E. Pepe, Challenging Congress's
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prison staff member fondled his genitals.2 56 The court dismissed the
claim because the court considered his physical injury to be de
minimis and his mental injury to be insufficient.2 5 7
In another case, the Illinois Department of Corrections housed
Alex Pearson, a gang member, at Tamms, a maximum-security
prison. 2 58 Tamms housed only prisoners who either presented safety
concerns, like gang affiliation, or had caused problems at a lower
security facility. 259 Because of these concerns, prisoners at Tamms
had no contact with other prisoners and left their cells only one hour a
day for individual recreation.2 6 0 Pearson successfully completed a
program that allowed him to transfer out of Tamms if he renounced
his gang affiliation. 26 1 Several weeks later, prison officials requested
Pearson complete another, previously undisclosed step in the program,
which required him to work as a confidential informant against his
former gang. 26 2 Pearson was unwilling to do so. 26 3 Shortly before he
was to be transferred, Pearson was disciplinarily reprimanded for the
first time since he had been at Tamms. 2 64 His transfer was halted
because of the reprimand and he had to spend over another year in
solitary confinement. 265 Pearson claimed in his lawsuit that prison
officials reprimanded him in retaliation for not becoming an
informant. 266 Despite finding the warden and other staff were guilty
of unjustifiably confining Pearson to solitary confinement, the court
only awarded Pearson nominal damages of $1 and $1.50 in attorney's
fees because he suffered depression, but no physical injury. 267
Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners' ConstitutionalRights: Equal Protection and
the PrisonLitigation Reform Act, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 58, 63-64 (1999).
256. Cobb v. Kelly, No. 4:07 CV 108-P-A, 2007 WL 2159315, at *1 (N.D.
Miss. July 26, 2007).
257. Id.
258. Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2006).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 735.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 735-37.
265. Id. at 736-37.
266. Id. at 737.
267. Id. at 742, 744.
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In addition to the physical injury requirement, PLRA also took
away filing fee waivers for prisoners like Pearson 268 and severely
restricted attorney's fees. 269
The physical injury requirement,
restricted attorney's fees, and absence of fee waivers impair prisoners'
ability to mount successful abuse claims in federal court.
PLRA has been extraordinarily successful in reducing prisoners'
lawsuits. 270 Between 1995 and 1997, the number of suits filed by
prisoners decreased thirty-three percent, despite a prison population
increase of ten percent during the same period.2 7 1 Since PLRA's
passage, the success rate of prisoner lawsuits has gone down.272
However, it is not clear whether PLRA has been successful at only
filtering out frivolous lawsuits, while allowing legitimate ones to
proceed.2 73 Professor Margo Schlanger argues that "rather than
improving the quality of the inmate docket, the PLRA has both placed
affirmative roadblocks (the filing fee and the lawyers' limits) in the
way of high-quality cases and added a very high exhaustion hurdle for
successful litigation of any constitutionally meritorious cases that are
nonetheless filed."2 74
PLRA-right or wrong, unsound and unfair as it may be-has
achieved its purpose of limiting lawsuits by prisoners. Taylor's rule
can help compensate for PLRA's limitations, while the Seventh
Circuit's rule would exacerbate them. The media must be allowed to
lend a voice to prisoners who otherwise will not be heard.
VIII. RETALIATORY RESPONSES TO INMATE GRIEVANCES
Inmate fear of retaliation by prison officials against prisoners who
file grievances about staff abuse is rampant.27 5 In one Ohio study,
268. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2) (2011) (providing no filing fee exemption for
inmates).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)-(3) (2011).
270. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1555, 1634
(2003).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1664.
274. Id.
275. James E. Robertson, "One of the Dirty Secrets of American
Corrections": Retaliation, Surplus Power, and Whistleblowing Inmates, 42 U.
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researchers found that "70.1 [percent] of inmates who brought
grievances indicated that they had suffered retaliation thereafter;
moreover, [eighty-seven percent] of all respondents ... agreed with
the statement, 'I believe staff will retaliate or get back at me if I use
the grievance process."' 276 Even among staff supervisors, the same
study found only twenty-one percent believed retaliation never
happened, and one warden even stated that he knew retaliation was
commonplace. 277 Sixty percent of prison supervisors in the study
"responded that 'a substantial number of inmates' do not file
grievances despite having legitimate 'issues,"' in part due to inmates'
fear of retaliation. 278
Besides the examples of retaliation discussed throughout the
Article, one more example illustrates this study's findings: William
Walker, an inmate and "jailhouse lawyer" in a Michigan prison, was
denied permission to shower.2 79 When Walker threatened to file a
grievance, guards responded that they were "tired of grievances" and
eventually allowed him to shower. 280 However, when Walker
returned to his cell, he found that guards had ransacked or "sh[ook]
down" his cell, removing many of his legal documents. 281
As previously discussed, PLRA requires prisoners to report
grievances to prison officials before they can get to court. 28 2 These
are the same prison officials who commonly retaliate against prisoners
who make grievances. The ability to send uncensored and unread
mail to the media would allow an alternative means to report prison
conditions and grievances, which would circumvent one problem
created by PLRA. Prisoners would no longer be complaining only to
prison officials, and prison officials would no longer be in a position
to discover prisoners' unflattering views by reading their mail. Thus,
a policy of unread media mail removes fear of reprisal from the
equation so prisoners' can fully disclose to the media the problems
MICH. J.L. REFORM 611, 613 (2009).

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
See supra Section VII.
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they are desperately seeking relief from. This is yet another reason
the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by treating mail to
the press as privileged.
IX. CONCLUSION
Historically, prisoners were not seen as people, and courts took a
mostly "hands-off' policy towards prison administration.
The
pendulum swung towards more favorable prisoners' rights decisions
during the tenure of the Warren Court, which eventually led to the
examination of prisoner mail policies in Martinez.
Since Martinez, the circuit courts have split in their assessment of
whether prisoners have the right to send letters to the media unopened
and unread by prison officials. 2 83 The split turns upon each circuit's
classification of prisoner mail as either general or privileged.2 8 4 The
Supreme Court should now resolve this split in favor of the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in Taylor.
In Ex parte Hull, the Court recognized the constitutional
importance of a prisoner's right of access to the court system. 285
KQED established that "an informed public [is] a safeguard against
'misgovernment."' 286 Articles by the Los Angeles Times illustrate the
important role the media can play in exposing violations of inmates'
civil rights.2 87 These newspaper expos6s of prison abuse can to lead
to prison reform efforts much the same as would occur if inmate
lawsuits were filed. Those lawsuits have been greatly curtailed by
PLRA, making media expos6s all the more vital in publicizing and
redressing prison abuse. Model and international codes support
inmates' right to send unread mail to the media. 28 8 Further, more than
half of the states where data is available generally allow prisoners
unfettered access to the media in one form or another already. 289 Both
abuse and retaliation against prisoners for filing grievances are

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See supra Section III.
Id.
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 547 (1941).
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
See supra Section IV.
See supra Section VI.
See supra Section V.
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29
pervasive.290 If prisoners cannot communicate with the media free
from prison officials' prying eyes, the media's position as the "eyes
and ears" 291 of the public in the prison system is reduced.
Taylor provides that prisoners should have the right to send
privileged, unopened, and unread mail to the media. 292 Under Taylor,
inmates can address letters to the business office of the media
representative they wish to correspond with so that prison officials can
check the authenticity of the address against a list of local and state
press officials' business addresses. 293 Prison officials then have fortyeight hours to determine whether the recipient of the letter is in fact a
media organization. 294 That policy properly recognizes the media's
role in publicizing prisoner abuse and obtaining redress for prisoner
grievances. Opening mail to the press, as allowed under the Seventh
Circuit's rule, violates the prisoner's right to redress grievances, as the
press participates in and may influence judicial proceedings by
creating publicity. 295
In Taylor, Judge Wisdom showed his understanding of the stifling
effect onerous mail policies have on prisoners' ability to redress their
grievances. He wrote, "[P]risoners may fear that a prison employee
who reads inmate correspondence will abuse the sensitive information
to which they have access. ... Inmates may fear, for example, that
jail officials will respond adversely to attempts to bring jail conditions
to the attention of [the media]." 296 In light of well-known retaliatory
practices, "this concern would not be unreasonable." 297
"As Fyodor Dostoevsky, who was imprisoned in Russia for
several years for his political beliefs, once said: 'The degree of
civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons."' 298 if
PLRA is the new norm and prisoners' access to courts in the form of
litigation is to be severely restricted, prisoners' free access to the

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See supra Sections IV, VII, and VIII.
KQED, 438 U.S. at 8, 15.
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 482 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 476.
Id.
See Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 175 (D. Mass. 2004).
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media is all that much more important to upholding prisoners'
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in Taylor and help prevent the U.S. from sliding
back down the road towards "civil death" for some of its most
vulnerable citizens.
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